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The basic question in the long-standing debate about free will (FW) is not whether FW can be
demonstrated to exist nor even whether it exists, but instead how to define it scientifically. If FW is
not dismissed as an illusion nor identified with a variety of unpredictability, then logical paradoxes
arise that make FW elusive to define. We resolve these paradoxes through a model of FW, in which
FW is a new causal primitive empowered to override physical causality under guidance. We develop
a simple mathematical realization of this model, that when applied to quantum theory, suggests
that the exercise of FW corresponds to a nonlinear POVM causing deviations from the Born rule.
In principle, these deviations would stand in conflict with known conservation laws and invariance
principles, implying that the brain, the presumed seat of FW, may be an arena of non-standard
physics. However, in practice it will be difficult to distinguish these deviations from quantum and
neural noise, and statistical fluctuations. We indicate possible neurobiological and neurological tests,
implications and applications of our proposed model.
I. INTRODUCTION
Free will (FW), as we informally understand it in daily life, is the power of a rational agent to pick her/his own
choice from among various alternative possbilities. But what exactly is FW? The age-old question has provoked much
debate among philosophers and scientists [1–4]. Our outlook on the world implicitly assumes that human behavior is
governed by FW: we choose, we plan and we normally hold people responsible for what they say or do, either because
we imagine that they are at liberty also not to act so, or because we don’t have the freedom to believe otherwise!
Neuroscience has been uncovering causal chains that appear to explain our choices, emotions and even beliefs, in
terms of neurophysical events extending back to the pre-natal stage. As much as it is interesting and important to
understand whether we have FW, there is a more elementary and pressing problem to deal with: namely to try to
define FW rigorously and scientifically in a way that agrees with the above intuitive notion. This last requirement is
important, as one can define almost anything one wants in a theory of one’s own design [5]. Having defined FW, one
might ask whether such a FW is compatible with known scientific knowledge or can be demonstrated experimentally
as a new kind of resource in Nature.
Philosophers over the millenia have proposed different responses to the problem. Two prominent positions are com-
patibilism, according to which determinism is compatible with FW, and incompatibilism, according to which the two
are incompatible. There are shades of intermediate positions. Compatibilism is espoused by, among others, Calvinists
who believe that personal freedom to choose does not preclude foreknowledge (possessed by a all-powerful intelligence)
of future choices. Two broad incompatibilist positions are (metaphysical) libertarianism and hard determinism. Ac-
cording to the former, in a situation of alternative possibilities (AP) which is ontologically (metaphysically) available,
an agent has the liberty to choose one or other option, which is not pre-determined. This position upholds FW, and
rejects determinism. By contrast, hard determinism upholds determinism and rejects FW, relegating it to an illusory
feeling. In Western philosophical thought, this is represented by, among others, Armenianism.
Recently, a number of physicists have studied FW mainly (but not exclusively) in connection with quantum me-
chanics (QM) [6–19]. The important contribution of quantum mechanics to this debate is in introducing a concrete
instance of fundamental indeterminism via the |ψ|2 Born rule. Whether this indeterminism is epistemic or ontic still
remains a moot issue and is related to the notion of realism in the sense of the Bell-Kochen-Specker theorems. In
the quantum approach to FW, some have assumed that quantum indeterminacy gives ‘elbow room’ for FW to act,
while others identify FW with unpredictability, or independence from all past information (with ‘past’ defined in an
appropriately relativistically invariant way). We call this approach soft incompatibilism, according to which FW is
incompatible with determinism but compatible with indeterminism. However, this approach, which also finds favor in
the neuroscientific and artificial intelligence (AI) communities, fails to capture the sense of control, of having liberty
and making a deliberate choice, implicit in the notion of FW.
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2In this work, we aim to define libertarian FW, which encompasses such a liberty, and to study its relation to the
laws of physics. Libertarian FW is arguably the most intuitive version of FW, and yet, as we will find, the most elusive
to define. We do not claim that it is somehow a better variety of FW, or that it can be experimentally demonstrated
at this time. It is our preferred understanding of FW simply because it feels right! The article is arranged as follows.
Section II discusses a specific compatibilist version of FW, due to the cognitive scientist Mackay. Section III presents
a logical paradox that would afflict attempts to define libertarian FW, and presents a resolution. Section IV explains
another basic logical paradox about libertarian FW. This logical barrier is surmounted in Section V through a new
model of FW. Certain biological and philosophical aspects of the model are considered in Section VI. Sections VII
and VIII may be omitted by readers not interested in quantitative aspects of the model. Section VII presents a simple
mathematical representation of the proposed model, while Section VIII applies it to quantum mechanics and considers
some unusual consequences. Neurological tests, implications and medical applications of our model are considered in
Section IX. We finally conclude with Section X, with a discussion on FW in connection with Darwinian evolution and
the subject of consciousness.
II. THE MACKAYAN ARGUMENT: FREE WILL FROM UNCOMPUTABILITY
We mention two flavors of what are arguably compatibilist positions: Calvinist-like (mentioned above) and Mack-
ayan. In the Mackayan position [20], the idea here is that even in deterministic dynamics, self-predictions lead to
indeterminacy, which is interpretable as FW.
According to this argument, given prediction P about agent X, if X believes P , then she can falsify it by acting
contrary to P . One might suppose that a more detailed algorithm to arrive at P would be able to take into consid-
eration X’s reaction, but X can simply choose to falsify that. It then follows that only if X disbelieves P , then P
holds with certainty, but then this would make X a kind of inconsistent agent, for disbelieving a truth. Thus, if X
(and hence the universe) is consistent, then X must believe P . To avoid the first inconsistency, that she falsify P if
she knew it, we conclude that believing P affects X’s brain state, invalidating the premise that went into reaching P .
Thus, X’s falsification of P does not imply inconsistency. But it does imply that any consistent predictive algorithm
P is unable to encompass her reaction to P . Therefore, according to Mackay, it is upto X how X chooses to act; she
can make P or ¬P true. This indeterminability is interpreted as FW.
A caeful scrutiny reveals the similarity of the structure of the above argument analogous to Go¨del’s celebrated
incompleteness theorem [21], when the notion of provability is replaced with that of belief, though, strangely, Mackay
denied the connection. To recast the Mackayan position in a form closer to Go¨del’s theorem: in a consistent sufficiently
rich, deterministic world, there will be unpredictable situations. Not surprisingly on account of the presence of self-
reference, Mackay’s argument can also be compared readily to Turing’s proof of the unsolvability of the halting
problem, where the putative algorithm that outputs P is analogous to the would-be halting algorithm h and the
nay-saying agent to the contradictive Turing machine that uses the h as a sub-routine. Mackayan free will, like Turing
uncomputability, comes from the fact that the cardinality of the set of outcome situations is greater than proofs of
prediction of an agent’s choice. Thus, in the Mackayan argument, unpredictability of a free agent’s choice is identified
with Go¨del incompleteness and Turing uncomputability.
But does incompleteness or uncomputability constiute a kind of FW? Intriguing though the idea is, we think
that it is, ultimately, philosophically unsatisfactory, because it identifies free will with unpredictability rather than
with genuine freedom, or even indeterminacy. Likewise, from a philosophical perspective, we think that the soft
incompatibilist approach from quantum mechanics does not go far enough, because sense of control in FW is not
explained. FW in its various quantum avatars looks just like free whim!
III. THE WEAK FREE WILL PARADOX AND ITS RESOLUTION
The reason libertarian FW resists definition is that attempting to define it leads to logical paradoxes, which we
discuss in this and the next section. Although these paradoxes were not, to our knowledge, explicitly mentioned
before, yet they implicitly crop up in past attempts to define FW, thwarting a definitive resolution to the problem
for over two millenia. It is not surprising that in the face of this daunting logical barrier, scientists tend to adopt a
position other than libertarianism.
If we accept the libertarian position, then by assumption of incompatibilism, one rules out determinism as the
universally correct description of the physical laws. But neither does indeterminism (as governed by some fixed
probability rule, P ) leave enough room for FW to act. Consider the sample mean Xn over N trials
lim
n→∞Pr
(∣∣Xn − µ∣∣ > ) = 0,
3by the Weak Law of Large Numbers. This implies that there is a ‘probability pressure’ not to choose atypical sequences,
which would cause deviations from the sample mean. Thus, there is a kind of long-run determinism, and hence a
restriction on FW as we intuitively understand it. For example, given a coin with outcome space Ω = {H,T} and the
corresponding probability vector P = (12 ,
1
2 ), the coin is not free to indefinitely choose outputs HHHHHHHHH· · · .
Thus liberatarian FW is compatible with neither determinism nor indeterminism, and thus belongs to the position
of hard incompatibilism. This situation creates a paradox for the libertarian position, which we call the Weak FW
Paradox (WFWP), whereby FW is compataible with neither of the available alternatives. The other mentioned
positions on FW are unaffected by WFWP.
Therefore, if we accept libertarian FW, the free-willed choice will potentially intefere with the underlying physical
dynamics D. This interference will take the form of (a) overriding causality, if D is deterministic; or (b) causing
deviations from the relevant probability rule P , if D is indeterministic.
Clearly, it is immaterial whether the underlying physics is classical or quantum. The arugment sometimes made,
that quantum indeterminism gives ‘room’ for free-willed action is thus not found to be persuasive. FW itself can’t
be part of the dynamics D, for in that case it could not produce the required deviations. Therefore, we require a
Cartesian dualism with a physical and extra-physical component making up a free-willed agent. Physical dynamics D
governs the former while FW comes from the latter.
IV. THE STRONG FREE WILL PARADOX
The above resolution of WFWP says that if libertarian FW exists, it must be an extra-physical resource whose
intervention causes deviations from D. It still leaves open the question what libertarian FW is or how it can be
consistently defined. Here we will show how trying to pin down its nature leads to another paradox, which we call the
Strong Free Will Paradox (SWFP). The paradox is obtained essentially by extending the traditional incompatibilist
claim for the incompatibility of determinism and FW, to that of indeterminism and FW. The idea is that the truth of
determinism or indeterminism would mean that we don’t control actions in a way one would expect of self-determining,
free-willed agents. Since determinism and indeterminism are the only available causal primitives, there is no such
thing as libertarian FW, according to this line of reasoning. There is a similarity to WFWP, but the focus has shifted
from “where?” to “what?”, or even “whether?”.
We present two slightly different versions of SFWP. In the first of them, one assumes that FW exists and tries to
locate it in terms of properties of the agent. According to this argument:
[I] An agent has free will only when her intentional actions emerge from the agent herself.
[II] Therefore, they are deterministic functions of her volitions, beliefs, desires etc, which we denote by variables of
intent, x
(1)
j .
[III] If there are no prior causes of her volitions, desires, etc., then the values x
(1)
j take on must be random, making
the agent’s volitions, desires, etc., and hence her actions, whimsical.
[IV] Since whimsicality undermines the notion of control or intent, x
(1)
j must not be random, but deterministic
functions of some other second order intent variables x
(2)
k , which, by virtue of [I], must belong to the agent
herself.
[V] As before, the variables x
(2)
k themselves are caused or uncaused. If the latter, then x
(2)
k are random, making
x
(1)
j , and hence also her actions, ultimately whimsical. But if the former, then x
(2)
k are not free but depend, by
a similar reasoning, on higher order variables x
(3)
j , and so on similarly to even higher orders indefinitely.
[VI] If this pattern of recursion terminates at some finite depth N , then x
(N)
j either has no causes or external causes
of unspecified origin. In the former case, we obtain capricious, indeterministic behavior, in the latter case,
unfree, deterministic behavior. Neither connotes FW as we recognize it.
In brief, when we try to incorporate the notion of will or intent into the action, the action becomes deterministic and
hence unfree. Putting freedom back means removing determinism, which undermines intent by making the action
random and the agent whimsical. Thus the ‘free’ and the ‘will’ in ‘free will’ are at loggerheads, making the word an
oxymoron. This is the Strong Free Will paradox (SFWP), according to which randomness and determinism seem to
be the only fundamental causal primitives in Nature, with libertarian FW a figment of imagination.
It is of interest to note that certain classical accounts of FW fall prey to SWFP, illustrating its elusiveness to define.
According to Thomas Hobbes, “A free agent is he that can do as he will, and forbear as he will....”. David Hume
4characterizes it thus: “power of acting or of not acting, according to the determination of the will: that is, if we choose
to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may.... This hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to
belong to everyone who is not a prisoner and in chains.” To paraphrase in terms of our discussion above, they both
are essentially saying E = E(x
(1)
j ), but weren’t taking the argument farther. Arthur Schopenhauer does take it one
step farther but says: “You can do what you will, but you cannot will what you will. In any given moment of your
life you can will only one definite thing and absolutely nothing other than that one thing.” He is thus effectively
responding to SWFP by characterizing E = E
(
x
(1)
j (x
(2)
k )
)
and denying the existence of libertarian FW. One can
try other variants, such as E = E(x
(1)
j ) being a probabilistic function, whereas x
(1)
j = x
(1)
j (x
(2)
j ) being deterministic,
so that there is mix of determinism (Will) and indeterminism (freedom) at different levels of the agent’s personality.
However, the core of SFWP remains.
A related, but different version of SFWP, tries to identify FW as a particular kind of influence over the act of
making a choice. According to this argument:
[A] Suppose that from a set of alternative possibilities (AP), a choice is eventually made by an agent.
[B] From the principle of excluded middle, the choice was made either according to a rule or it was not made
according to a rule.
[C] In the former case, there is no genuine AP situation. Hence we have determinism, and there is no FW.
[D] In the latter case, we have pure randomness, and hence, again, no FW in the sense of the agent’s control and
voluntary choice.
We thus find again that the agent’s choice is deterministic or random, with no apparent room for (libertarian) FW.
This is the basis of the pessisimist view that there can be no such thing as FW [2].
Implication [C] lies historically at the heart of the incompatibilist argument. Here, if the rule is prescriptive, we
have causal determinism, as a law of physical dynamics in Nature. If the rule is only descriptive, we have logical
determinism, with outcomes of future choices being known to an all-powerful intelligence and assigned definite truth
values.
V. RESOLUTION OF THE STRONG FW PARADOX
We propose the following hard incompatibilist model as a way out of SFWP, drawn from an interpretation of Eastern
philosophy. According to the model, the conscious personality of the free-willed agent, which may be called the Ego
(after the father of modern psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud), is influenced in an AP situation by three structural
elements. This tripartite division is at the heart of our model. Two of the elements, and their functions, are as
follows:
Nature (N). Imposes mental constraints in the form of desires, instinctive drives and emotional tendencies.
Understanding (U). Offers guidance in action through a rational capacity to model the world, and understand the
(ethical, social, financial, etc.) implications of each choice.
When a situation with alternative possibilities is encountered, Nature N and Understanding U present their respec-
tive recommendations to the Ego on selecting one of the alternatives. While the recommendation of Nature appears
as a desire, that of Understanding appears as a thought or feeling. As a specific example, the desire may be oriented
towards seeking pleasure (Freud’s pleasure principle), while the thought or feeling may be about conscientious re-
straint. The dilemma sometimes experienced by one about to make a choice is the possible conflict between the two
recommendations.
It is convenient to designate the mind as the seat of Nature N. In Freudian psychoanalytic terminology, the mind
may be identified with the id. Similarly, the seat of U is posited to be the intellect, which may be identified with
Freudian superego. To use a crude but visually helpful computer analogy, we may picture the ego as the CPU (central
processing unit) of a compter, with U and N being softwares uploaded onto it during the waking period from their
respective seats, which are like hard disk memory locations.
For non-libertarian accounts of FW, including AI, the two elements U and N suffice. They are both causal resources,
i.e., systems that can drive the agent’s behavior independently, and thus aspects of the dynamics D. The eventual
choice will be some deterministic or probabilistic outcome of their interplay. Philosophically speaking, the main
drawback with such accounts is that they lack the sense of having liberty to make a deliberate choice.
5Crucially, for (libertarian) FW, U is not a causal resource, but a guidance resource, unlike N. When the input
from U and N are experienced as possibly conflicting tendencies by the Ego, the guidance by itself is powerless to
influence the agent’s choice. A further element is required, the third and last in our model, which expresses the idea of
empowering the Ego to deliberately choose between the recommendations of desire and guidance. This is the faculty
of volition, or simply:
Freedom of Will (F). The extra-physical freedom to orient or align the choice in line with the Understanding U,
by overcoming, if necessary, the Constraints imposed by Nature N.
The extra-physicality follows from the resolution of the WFWP. SWFP also implies it because if it were not extra-
physical, then F would be part of the underlying dynamics D as a deterministic or indeterministic aspect, and not
libertarian, as required. As to the question of whether such an extra-physical resource is sanctioned by physics or can
be tested, we return to it in Section VIII. Here we are concerned only with obtaining a suitable definition. We call
our model ‘FUN’ in recognition of the fact that it involves the triad of elements F, U and N.
Faced with an AP situation, Nature and Understanding may present conflicting recommendations to the Ego under
some description– a desire or drive vs a thought, feeling or belief. If the Nature-induced desire is aligned away
from the Understanding-proposed thought, then supported by FW, the thought acts as a restraint, whereas if the
desire is attuned to U’s recommendation, then FW acts to that extent effortlessly. Together F and U constitute a
causal resource, in which F contributes the magnitude or “energy” while U the direction. Recognizing this is crucial
in resolving SFWP, and its oversight is the cause of much confusion in existing accounts of FW. Thus FW is the
expression of F in a situation where the ego is exposed to the potentially conflicting recommendations of U and N.
FW as defined above is the new causal primitive or principle of causation, apart from determinism and indeter-
minism. By its fundamental character, it is empowered to override physical causality (of Nature) under the intellect’s
guidance. FW thus enables a state of affairs wherein logical determinism holds whereas causal determinism fails. We
return to this point elsewhere to use this as a basis for a (meta-)logical framework to characterize FW. We think that
our definition of FW, and a quantification of it below, agree with the notion of volitional causation proposed in Ref.
[25], as distinguished from physical causation
The agent’s freedom to control, together with the Understanding, as we have proposed, bears some similarity to
the Ultimate Responsibility posited by the philosopher Kane [26]. However, the role of F and U need not be confined
to moral issues alone, and may extend to other walks of life. For example: agent X is suffering from a medical
problem, and has the Understanding that X needs to undergo treatment. However X’s Natural tendency, governed
by Constraints N, would be to avoid the treatment because it would cause discomfort. X exercises FW to endure the
discomfort in the interest of later cure and longterm benefits.
We will now prove that the FUN model resolves SFWP. In particular, the above example highlights how the
incompatibilist implication [C] of SFWP fails. If one happens to be familiar with the Weltanschauung, and hence the
Understanding of X, and X has high free will, then the freely chosen alternative will be predictable. Proposition 1
below, whose truth is clear in this light, is rigorously validated by our definition of FW. We define a Saint as an agent
whose Understanding is ethical and whose FW is near maximal.
Proposition 1 Presented with the choice between the good and the evil, the Saint freely chooses the good.
By definition, the Saint, equipped with maximal FW, can if necessary override any Constraints like desire and
instinctive drives imposed by his human nature, and align his choice in tune with his Understanding.
Thus, the deterministic behavior and predictability of the Saint does not preclude his free will, contrary to the
incompatibilist implication [C] in SWFP. Knowing that a person is a Saint, we have sure foreknowledge of the
ethicality of all his future choices, because he is endowed with high FW. We have here an instance of a descriptive
rule (logical determinism) that is strictly non-prescriptive (i.e., strictly not causal determinism). Intuitively, this is
clear, since one should be able to choose freely, even to act predictably. Not to be able to choose to act predictably
would imply a constraint on freedom.
The instance of Saintly determinism does not make our model compatibilistic, as it must be clear. In particular,
other situations are allowed to exist by our model, that resist compatibilistic interpretation, as noted below. Suppose
that an agent’s FW is not maximal. Then his choice will fluctuate randomly between choosing according to the
dictates of his nature and the recommendation of his Understanding. This is illustrated in the following proposition,
whose intuitvely apparent truth is validated rigorously by our definition of FW.
Proposition 2 Presented with the choice between the good and the evil, the Conscientious Criminal vacillates.
This criminal, being conscientious, has a clear Understanding of the virtue of ethical behavior, but, owing to lack of
sufficiently high FW, cannot always overcome the compulsion of his criminal nature. His choice is random, being good
sometimes and being evil at other times. Thus the randomness of his choice does not imply lack of free will. Here it
6only implies low free will. The pessimist [2] implication [D] in SWFP is also therefore falsified. The recognition of
FW as a new form of causation also clarifies why the first version of SWFP fails. For example, implication [VI] is
incorrect for reasons stated above.
In contrast to Proposition 1, predictable behavior can arise also because of low degree of FW. Consider:
Proposition 3 Presented with the choice between the good and the evil, the Hardcore Criminal chooses evil.
Although the Hard-core Criminal may possess an ethical Understanding, yet, because he almost entirely lacks FW,
his choice is deterministically decided by his evil nature. Knowing that a person is a Hardcore Criminal, we have fore-
knowledge of the iniquity of all his future choices because he lacks any FW. If we theoretically empower him with some
FW, we obtain the scenario of Proposition 2. In other words, adding a degree of FW removes determinacy. Clearly,
this prediction of the model is not in accord with compatibilism. Therefore, our model is neither incompatibilist nor
compatibilist.
VI. SOME NEUROSCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS AND PHILOSOPHICAL MUSINGS
The FUN model as it stands does not explain the notion of moral responsibility. When the given an AP situation is
a moral one, responsibility arises arguably because a person has the power F to follow through the guidance provided
by U by overcoming the dictates imposed by N. The model does not explain how the differences in the degree of
freedom, eg., between that of a Saint and a Conscientious Criminal, arise. Unless an agent can somehow be construed
as having played a role in the current level of freedom, the judgment of moral responsibility must be relative (to a
given degree of freedom). Further assumptions are needed, which will be taken up in a subsequent work, to develop
a more complete notion of moral responsibility in the model.
For the triad of elements of the FUN model described in section V, we suggest the following plausible brain
correlates. For convenience, we refer to this neurologically adapted version of FUN as the FUN# model. The element
N, and hence the mind’s brain correlate, is probably the limbic system, which, comprising brain structures like the
hippocampus, amygdala, etc., is known to support a variety of functions, including behavior, emotion and long term
memory. The element U, and by extension the intellect’s brain correlate is located presumably in the brain prefrontal
cortex. This region of the brain is believed by neuroscientists and psychologists to be responsible for many higher
cognitive functions, such as planning, differentiating between the good and bad, determining consequences of actions,
planning actions, and so on.
The FUN# model posits that, while these two regions participate in decision making processes, they do not
correspond to the ultimate control module (UCM), the brain correlate of FW. This could be a localized region, such as
the pineal gland. The claim for this gland is mainly historical. The FUN# model accepts this as a working hypothesis
on the strength of the observation that this gland is centrally located in the brain, as befits a UCM. Physiologically,
this would mean that brain areas corresponding to voluntary muscle movement (the motor cortex) will be functionally
linked to the frontal cortex, the limbic system and the region of the pineal gland, during the execution of planned
actions.
In the FUN model, F, U and N are independent elements that interact when a choice is made. In actual fact, they
influence each other at the subconscious level in complicated situation-dependent ways, so that the elements as they
appear at the conscious level are ‘dressed versions’ rather than the ‘bare versions’ (to use terminology borrowed from
optics or particle physics). The agent’s personality is thus a nonlinear functional of the elements, where each element
influences the others and also itself indirectly through its effect on the others.
An instance where U affects N is in consumers’ brand loyalty, which manifests as preferences, detectable as neural
correlates, that humans display towards products that are otherwise similar (cf. an interesting study reported in Ref.
[28] with regard to drinks). An instance where N affects U is the familiar case of people showing reduced objectivity
when dealing with those they have a strong emotional connection (whether negative or positive) with. An instance
where N affects (diminishes) freedom is when a drug addict (resp., smoker) relentlessly seeks his next shot (resp.,
puff) even though he knows it is not good for him; and so on.
For this reason, from a behavioral perspective, it would be more convenient to talk not in terms of interaction
between the elements, but instead in terms of interaction between three broad traits: that dominated by Nature
N (“the animalistic”), that dominated by freedom (“the saintly”), and that wherein these two are in balance (“the
human”). The philosophy of Yoga [24] terms these three basic traits as tamas, rajas and sattva. In this line of thought,
a human character is constituted by these three basic traits and determined by their relative dominance. The sattvic
type of humans have the highest degree of FW, while the tamasic have the lowest.
To complete the model, we offer some thoughts on the extraphysical agency to which the will is ascribed. Here we
will appeal to the philosophies of Vedanta [24] and Yoga, which recognize and supply such an entity– the Self (a´tman
in Sanskrit), which is quite distinct from the Ego (ahamka´ra) and conceived of as the essential individual. At a deeper
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FIG. 1: Scheme of the structure of the individual psyche as used in our model of FW. The scheme is based primarily on the
the Eastern philosophy of Vedanta [24] and Yoga [24], with inputs from Freud’s iceberg model in psychoanalysis and E. Cayce
[29]. The ego receives causal constraints from the mind, guidance from the intellect and freedom from the Self to direct the
choice in line with the guidance. In a word: Thought over Nature. In this geometric interpretation, the ego consciousness is
horizontal (spreading out concentrically from the center), while the mode of Cognizance of the Self is the witness consciousness
(sa´ksh´ı bha´va in Sanskrit). This represents a bottom-up perspective from the base of the figure, which is vertical and illumines
all overlying elements of the personality, including the ego. In this sense, the Self’s Witness consciousness is higher dimensional
than the personality’s ego consciousness. (An even higher dimensional consciousness can be associated geometrically with
an observer looking at the above image from outside the page. This perspective represents a subtler, Witness of Witness
Consciousness. And so on. Vedantic philolosophy posits that this hierarchy terminates in brahman, the Absolute or the
fundamental subtratum.)
Faculty Seat Function Possible physical correlate Character trait
Nature, N Mind/Id Mental constraints limbic system tamas
Understanding U Intellect/Superego Guidance Brain frontal cortex rajas
Freedom F Self / – Control pineal gland? sattva
TABLE I: The three structural elements of libertarian FW according to the FUN model, their corresponding place of origin
(with a Freudian near-equivalent term), the function of the elements, possible physical correlates in the brain, and (in the
terminology of Yogic philosophy) the corresponding character trait.
level of consciousness, the Self fans out to serve as the overarching substratum on which the agent’s faculties of Ego,
Understanding and Nature rest. At the deepest level of consciousness, there is no structure and the individual Selves
resolve into an unindividuated Absolute. Contradictory as these descriptions seem, they can be readily interpreted
geometrically, cf. Figure 1. As in the Freudian structural iceberg model, the Constraints of N are communicated from
the subconscious mind to the conscious Ego, where they are experienced as desires. The Understanding and Will are
exercised preconsciously, in that although having deeper roots, they are supplied from within the conscious level.
The Self cognizes the faculties of Ego, mind and intellect through a mode of Consciousness called witness conscious-
ness (sa´kshi bha´va). This is subtler than and different from the agent’s Ego consciousness. Figure 1 depicts a simple
geometric interpretation of these modes of awareness. The basic information about the the above three elements are
summarized in Table I.
VII. A QUANTITATIVE VERSION OF THE FUN MODEL
We develop a minimal mathematical model, denoted FUN+, to quantify the qualitative ideas developed above as
part of the FUN model. Given an AP situation, and a choosing event e, let the choice be represented by a random
variable E over the sample space Ω ≡ {e1, e2, · · · , en}, representing the possible n choices that can be made. If e
8involves a material particle, which presumably lacks any libertarian FW, the outcome ej at event e would occur with
probability pj , and there is no distortion of P .
The dictates imposed by the Constraints of Nature N are represented, over Ω, by the probability vector
P = {p1, · · · , pn}, normalized so that
∑n
j=1 pj = 1. The vector could be pure (∀j (pj)2 = pj) or mixed. The
recommendation due to Understanding U is represented, over Ω, by the probability vector PU = {pU1 , · · · , pUn }, which
is normalized and could be pure or mixed. For example, if Ω = {good, evil}, then we would have PU = {1, 0}
according to the moral criterion, whereas by Nature, P = { 12 , 12}. If Ω = {coffee, tea, alcohol}, the Understanding
could use a health criterion to return PU = { 12 , 12 , 0}, whereas it may be that P = { 14 , 14 , 12}.
FW F, as freedom to drive the choice from the prescriptive P towards the recommended PU , is represented by
the scalar quantity σ (where 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1) such that greater freedom connotes larger σ. The probability vector P ′
representing the eventual choice of an alternative, is obtained by distortion of P towards PU in the measure of
strength of σ. A particularly simple form to capture this idea is a convex combination of P and PU , parametrized by
σ:
P ′ = σPU + (1− σ)P. (1)
Thus the random variable P ′ representing the selected option is a weighted mean of random variables PU and P,
representing, respectively, Understanding and Nature. When σ = 1 (maximal FW), P ′ = PU , i.e., the choice is
aligned with the Understanding. When σ = 0 (vanishing FW) P ′ = P , i.e., the choice is entirely determined by
Nature. For example, if P is the probability for obtaining an outcome 0 or 1 when measuring the Pauli observable
σz on a quantum two-level system (qubit) in the state α|0〉+
√
1− |α|2|1〉, then P = (|α|2, 1− |α|2). Since the qubit
arguably lacks FW (σ = 0), P ′ = P according to Eq. (1). The nonlinear functional P ′[P ] must be viewed as a set
of ontic probabilities, and thus a fundamental limitation on the predictability of an agent’s choice, and not epistemic
probabilities arising from ignorance about the details of an agent.
The unpredictability ξ of an agent may be quantified by the Shannon entropy of P ′ = {p′x}:
ξ ≡ H(P ′;σ) = −
∑
x
p′x log p
′
x = 〈log(σpUx + (1− σ)px)〉, (2)
where H(P ′;σ) is the Shannon entropy of P ′ for a given value of σ. The following two results quantitatively present
our earlier resolution of SFWP. In each case, we provide an example in the following two theorems, that contradicts
each of implications [C] and [D] of SWFP.
Claim 1 The predictability of a Saint’s behavior does not imply his lack of FW.
Proof. We construct an explicit instance of predictable behavior with (high) FW. Let Ω = {good, evil}. By
definition, the Saint of Proposition 1 is ethical in his Understanding, so that PU = (1, 0), and his will is free, so that
σ ≈ 1. Even if he may bodily not be attuned to perfection, still by dint of his high FW, he is always able to choose in
accord with his (ethical) Understanding, i.e., P ′ = PU by Eq. (1). From Eq. (2), we have H(P ′;σ) ≈ 0 bit, implying
almost complete predictability, irrespective of P . 
This implies, as noted earlier, that our model is not incompatibilist. More generally, we note that H(P ′;σ) is not
a monotonous function of σ. The regime where
dH(P ′;σ)
dσ
< 0, (3)
and thus increase in FW leads to certainty, may be regarded as a zone of disagreement with the incompatibilist
position. For example, given a situation involving two choices, with Ω = {0, 1} and PU = {1, 0} and P = {0, 1},
dH/dσ < 0 for 0.5 < σ ≤ 1.
Claim 2 The randomness of the Conscientious Criminal’s choice does not imply his lack of FW.
Proof. We construct an explicit instance of random behavior with non-vanishing FW. In the case of the Conscentious
Criminal of Proposition 2, who has non-vanishing but not maximal FW, let σ = 12 , and let P ≈ (0, 1), corresponding
to the constraint imposed by his evil Nature. From Eq. (1), we have P ′ = (0.5, 0.5), and hence ξ ≈ 1, implying near
maximal randomness in choice. However, he does not lack FW, as σ > 0. 
In the case of the Hard-core Criminal of Proposition 3, we have the same Ω, P and PU as in the Example used
in Theorem 2, but σ ≈ 0, corresponding to this criminal’s low FW. From Eq. (1), we have P ′ ≈ P , and thus from
9Eq. (2), ξ ≈ 0, implying very little unpredictability in choice, similar in this respect to the Saint of Proposition 1.
However, unlike with the saint, whose predictability comes from high FW, here the predictability is due the criminal’s
sure surrender to his natural instinctive constraints. Augmenting his FW, we find that
H(P ′;σ)
dσ
> 0, (4)
that is, increase in FW leads to increase in uncertainty (when 0 < σ < 0.5). Thus our model is also not compatibilist.
Together, Eqs. (3) and (4) imply that our model is neither compatibilist nor incompatibilist.
The FUN model implies that σ must be at least partially extra-physical and cannot be described by any purely
physical theory, even a theory-of-everything (ToE), that encompasses only physical phenomena. In particular, artificial
intelligence (AI), which is fundamentally built on (quantum) physical rules, cannot capture true cognitive behavior.
These considerations entail that a human agent, and by extension any sentient agent, could not be considered
merely as a sufficiently complex robot, but a qualitatively distinct class of entities. Here Penrose’s interesting thesis
is worth noting, according to which conscious processes are fundamentally non-algorithmic [30].
VIII. QUANTUM INDETERMINISM AND FREE WILL
WFWP shows that quantum indeterminism is not better for FW than classical determinism. However, the fact
remains that the world is fundamentally a quantum mechanical place. Further, there is in a sense a lesser departure
from the physical dynamics D through free-willed intervention if D were indeterministic rather than deterministic, in
that there is only a statistical violation of causality in the former case, rather than the logical violation of causality,
as it is with the latter.
Accordingly, if X is the random variable corresponding to a FW-influenced quantum measurement M on system
S (presumably a suitably small brain element) in state |ψ〉, then X would deviate from the Born probability rule.
Free-willed intervention will therefore manifest as statistical deviations from the Born rule. By contrast, the freedom
or ‘free will’ of quantum particles, which is plain quantum randomness, will conform to the Born rule. In the model
described below (called FUN++), which is a particular realization of the FUN+ model, we propose that FW intervenes
by controling the collapse of the wave function.
To begin with, we represent the AP situation as a uniform quantum superposition, and the willful choice by a
directed collapse of the wavefunction. This quantum model thus presumes objective collapse of the wave-function,
and is compatible with interpretations of quantum mechanics that admit it. The exercise of FW is broadly divided
into three stages as follows:
Attention. Faced with an AP situation of alternatives j, the brain creates a quantum superposition that reflects the
dictates of Nature N:
|Ψ〉 =
∑
j
√
pj |j〉 (5)
in a suitable subneuronal system S in an appropriate basis B = {|j〉}, where the states |j〉 correspond to the base
choice space Ω. The main requirement is that it should be possible to shield S indefinitely from decoherence or
other noise, while the process of making a choice is under way. According to Ref. [27], brain microtubules may
be the seat of such superpositions.
Survey. The ego surveys the recommendations of the mind and intellect. This event is mathematically represented
by the preparation of a nonlinear positive operator-valued measurement (POVM)
Mj ≡
√
p−1j
(
σpUj + (1− σ)pj
)|j〉〈j|, (6)
which satisfy the completeness condition
∑
j〈Ψ|M†jMj |Ψ〉 = 1. In the absence of FW, σ = 0, and the POVM
reduces to ordinary projective measurement.
Collapse. Application of the POVM to the state |Ψ〉 causes the transition:
|Ψ〉 −→ Mj |Ψ〉√
〈Ψ|M†jMj |Ψ〉
, (7)
with probability 〈Ψ|M†jMj |Ψ〉.
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The last stage in the model is tantamount to controlling and directing the wavefunction collapse to produce an
outcome probability distribution that is closer (as quantified by trace distance, relative entropy or any other suitable
distance measure) to PU = {pUj } than P = {pj}, if FW is available. If FW is absent, then Nature alone determines
the outcome probability distribution, which, moreover, conforms to the Born rule.
When σ 6= 0, the resulting probabilities of outcomes will violate the Born rule. In general, such violations can
give rise to various non-standard effects, among them violation of energy conservation, possibility of signaling at
superluminal speed [31] and the possibility of counter-intuitive models of computation that allow efficient solution
of hard problems [31]. However, these non-standard effects will be confined to a small sub-cellular region of the
brain, where it will not be easily discernible from measurment errors, decoherence effects, neural noise and statistical
fluctuations. Moreover, it can be facilely masked behind the remaining features of the brain’s physiology, which can
be described in terms of deterministic, classical mechanisms (e.g., metabolic changes leading to arousal potentials in
motor neurons, initiating familiar physical movements of the body).
Finally, it is worth stressing that the extra-physical agency posited to determine the outcome of wavefunction
collapse should not be confused with hidden variables in the sense of Bohm [32]. The latter represents a device to
turn QM into a deterministic theory, and thus restore classical causality, whereas in our approach requires, FW is a
new form of causation.
IX. NEUROSCIENTIFIC IMPLICATIONS, TESTS AND APPLICATIONS
In the conventional view, the brain is a complex input-output device, with apparently voluntary actions arising
from a mix of deterministic and indeterministic mechanisms. So it is an interesting question what would constitute a
falsifiable proof of FW. For example, in research reported in Ref. [33], tethered fruit flies (Drosophila melanogaster) in
a visually impoverished environment had their flight maneuvers recorded. Lacking any external input, their random
behavior should have resembled a Poisson process. However, the analysis showed that the temporal structure of fly
behavior follows a Le´vy-like probabilistic behavior pattern. At first blush, it seems possible that this may be due to
spontaneous behavior arising from (a primitive version of) libertarian FW of the fruit flies. However, it turns out
that the observed pattern can be simulated via intrinsic noise amplified by suitable nonlinearity [33].
Experiments that purport to disprove the existence of FW can also find alternate explanations. Based on a study of
volunteers wearing scalp electrodes, Libet and collaborators [34] showed in 1983 that a ‘readiness potential’ (RP) was
detected a few tenths of second before the subjects, in their own reckoning, made the decision to perform an action (to
flex a finger or wrist). Their result was interpreted as indicating that the motor cortex was preparing for the action,
that unconscious neural processes predetermine actions and hence that FW was illusory. In a recent comment on the
experiment, Miller and Trevena [35] asked subjects to wait for an audio tone before making a decision to tap a key
or not. If the activity detected by Libet et al. really was the making of the decision prior to any conscious awareness
of doing so, then that activity ought to occur only if the subjects decided to act. But no such correlation was found.
Miller and Trevena conclude that the RP may only indicate that the brain is paying attention and does not indicate
that a decision has been made.
Under the circumstances, one suggestion would be to trace backwards along a deterministic observable causal chain
of neurons to the specific area in the motor cortex responsible, perhaps a single neuron, that may be considered
as initiating a free-willed action at the physiological level, and hence a candidate site for carrying signatures of the
putative new physics, such as the claimed deviation from the Born rule.
Identifying such single neurons will be difficult, given the high density of neuronal packing, and the weakness of
excitatory synapses, which would make the role of individual neurons in the brain cortex hard to identify. Further,
the extreme complicatedness of brain dynamics and attendent decoherence, measurement errors, noise and statistical
fluctuations, will play an adverse role. A study where the twitching of a mouse’s whisker has been traced to single
pyramidal neurons in the cortex is reported in Ref. [36]. These neurons could be examined for unusual behavior
that might be considered as appropriate signatures, after suitable allowance has been made for noise and innervations
from neighboring neurons: for example, there may be fluctuations in the whisker-twitch causing potentials that could
somehow not be ascribed to any neighboring influences. The neuron may then be examined carefully for a sub-cellular
site to which the initiation of the twitch causing potentials may be attributed.
Another promising area to look for evidence suggestive of FW is psychiatry and neurology, which are startlingly
revelatory on how, from a physiological perspective, the human mind works [38]. The FUN# model suggests that the
decision making ability in a human is affected, possibly leading to anti-social behavior, in broadly three different ways:
when the limbic system, or the frontal cortex, or the pineal gland area (or any other candidate UCM) is impaired. If
in some case such behavior does not coincide with impairment to the limbic system or the frontal cortex, then there
is a reasonable case to attribute the behavior to diminished FW. Studying such cases, if any, would help locate the
UCM and verify whether the pineal gland hypothesis holds good.
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There are potential therapeutic and medical applications based on the above observations. The FUN# model can
help clarify what abnormalcy of behavior means and can help classify abnormal depending of which faculty is affected.
If a particular behavioral disorder can be attributed to one of the three above causes, then the therapy prescribed to
the afflicted patient could also be varied with better efficacy.
X. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
A conservative, Darwinian view regarding the origin of FW would be that it enables an organism to deviate
from the local gradient in the brain’s energy landscape, and to better than locally optimize in the struggle for self-
presevervation, which would require improvisation under novel situations; once this was done, FW brought along
with it potential by-products, like altruism, self-harm, etc., behaviors which are not necessarily conducive to self-
preservation, and hence not ‘intended’ by the evolutionary process that gave rise to FW. Another possibility is that
FW is an emergent phenomenon that is a product of self-organization in complex quantum physical systems. These
views are not necessarily incompatible with the FUN model. If anything, one can be adventurous and suggest this
extra-physical agency guides or conduces to Darwinian evolution to make the human physiology optimal for the
physical experience! For example, it is known that the higher the oxygen concentration (up to a point), the better
it is for the metabolism and life of organisms. It is also known that the lower the altitude, the higher the oxygen
concentration. If there is FW, an organism in a mountainous area may feel the urge to explore farther by climbing
higher, thereby improving its chances of reaching a valley that is deeper, due to which the oxygen concentration is
higher, than in the valley reached by following the local gradient.
Finally we offer our opinion on FW being, together with awareness, aspects of consciousness. To be aware of a theory
is to be able to talk about it and to understand its implications and limitations. To this end, one requires a meta-
theory, which is equipped with a langauge in which to formalize propositions about the theory. An axiomatic system
that is rich enough to encompass the meta-theory will, in general, be more powerful than the one that axiomatizes
the theory. An instance of this is provided by Go¨del’s theorem [21], which provides a metamathematical proof of
mathematically undecidable propositions.
If FW did not exist, and the behavior of observers were entirely determined by the rules of the base theory, then
the observers’ algorithmic complexity [37] would not be greater than that of the theory, making them incapable of
encompassing the meta-theory. Equipped with FW, human experimenters can be meta-entities in the theory. It allows
them to freely pose questions, perform tests and draw inferences about the theory as external agents whose choices
are not entirely determined by the theory. From this perspective, FW is an aspect of the consciousness of sentient
observers that is necessary to make them aware of a physical theory such as QM and to experience the (quantum)
world as humans do.
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